This paper reviews recent development of China's agricultural domestic support policy, especially the transition from taxing farmers and agriculture to providing direct subsidies to grain production and purchased inputs. A model-based quantitative analysis on the effects of these policy changes has been conducted. Simulation results suggest that recent policy changes have likely achieved the declared policy goals of increasing grain production and boosting farm income. Much of the increase in grain production and farm income can be attributed to higher per unit return to arable land, land reallocation to grain production, and extra agricultural employment triggered by the policy changes.
as well as the external constraints imposed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) on how much support China can provide for its agriculture, make the Chinese experience an interesting case for further investigation.
These policy changes first reflect the Chinese leadership's attention to the so-called "San-Nong" problem (i.e. the three agriculture-related issues: agriculture, rural areas, and peasants). The core of the "San-Nong" problem is the relative decline of farm income (as compared to income earned by urban residents) and in connection to this, the rising rural-urban income gap and the East-West regional imbalance in China.
Although migrations of rural labors to urban areas and off-farm activities in the rural areas have helped moderate the widening income gaps, rural residents solely relying on farm income have nevertheless experienced much slower income growth in recent years. In responding to these challenges, the current Chinese leadership has placed the "San-Nong" problem among its top priorities. For instance, the various "No. 1 documents" of recent years emphasize the need to increase farm income and the importance of maintaining grain self-sufficiency as a way of improving farm income. 4 Reducing/eliminating agriculture tax and introducing direct farm subsidies are considered essential instruments in achieving these policy objectives. More broadly, some authors argue that raising farm income reflects the Chinese leadership's subscription to the "consumption-driven" growth path. 5 Needless to say, recent strong economic growth has sped up this policy transition as agriculture's share in China's GDP is shrinking and the once-vital revenue from agricultural taxations is becoming less and less important to the national treasury. 6 In light of these policy trends, many interesting research questions emerge. Some of these questions are concerned with the embodied domestic policy objectives. For 4 These documents were issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council of China. There have been ten such documents, all of which addressed issues related to agriculture, rural areas, and peasants. The first five "No. 1 documents" were issued during [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] , whereas the last five were issued during [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . A brief overview of these documents (in Chinese) can be found at the official Xinhua News Agency's website (http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2006-02/09/content_4156863.htm), which also contains links to full text to the latest documents. The full text of the 2007 No. 1 Document was publicly released by the Xinhua News Agency on January 29, 2007 (see http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-01/29/content_5670478.htm) 5 For instance, Lardy (2007) notes that China formally endorsed a consumption-driven growth path in 2004 and argues that eliminating agriculture tax and introducing subsidies are part of the strategy to pursue this new growth path. 6 In 1950, agricultural tax revenue comprised of 39 percent of China's total tax revenue. This share shrank to 5.5 percent in 1979 and to less than 1 percent in 2004 (Ministry of Finance, China).
instance, to what extent have these changes led to the realization of the policy objectives of raising farm income and maintaining grain self-sufficiency? What are the preferred policy instruments to achieve these objectives?
Looking ahead, it appears that an about-face of the recent policy switch is unlikely.
On the contrary, there are indications that the abolishment of agriculture tax will be permanent and the subsidies will increase in the coming years. Assuming this trend continues, one would also ask whether current subsidy instruments will still be applied in the future, especially in connection to the relevant disciplines on agricultural domestic support contained in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). In the case of China, the relevant disciplines are the de minimis exemption on the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) and the so-called "Blue Box" payments (e.g. those production-limiting programs that are based on fixed area and yields).
Should the support paid in the current forms approach or even exceed the applicable exemption ceilings, China might have to re-design its support programs to make them comply with its WTO accession commitments. One way of doing so without cutting the spending is to switch from the presumably inefficient and trade/productiondistorting support instruments to less distorting decoupled instruments which can be classified as Green Box payments.
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The purposes of this paper are to provide a first quantitative assessment on the impact of recent policy changes on China's agricultural production, trade and farm income, and to evaluate likely consequences of their possible future developments with a reference to China's WTO commitments on agricultural domestic support. 8 Findings from these exercises will not only contribute to the understanding of these policy trends and their consequences, but also provide useful insights into designing agricultural domestic support in the future for China.
7 At the time of writing this paper, the only notification made to the WTO by China concerning agricultural domestic support was submitted in 2006 for the reporting period 1999 -2001 (WTO, 2006 . The notified current total AMS and Blue Box were both zeros for 2001. However, China did report CNY242 billion Green Box payments for 2001. 8 To our best knowledge, there are virtually no published quantitative analyses on the effects of recent policy changes on China's farm income and agricultural production. The exception is Gale et al. (2005) , which provides a calculation suggesting a CNY18 per mu (equivalent to 667 square meters or 1/15 hectare) contribution of tax reduction and subsidies to "profit" from producing three major grains.
The quantitative exercises underlying the analysis contained in the current paper are conducted within a computable general equilibrium framework where detailed policy instruments relating to agricultural taxation and the new subsidies are represented.
This modeling framework also allows for alternative policy instruments to be analyzed in counterfactual scenarios. Actual budget outlays associated with these policy instruments, collected from official Chinese sources and the OECD's PSE estimates for China, are calibrated to a global database accompanying the model.
Together, the database and model are deployed for conducting the quantitative exercises.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews recent agricultural policy development and most recent policy practices in China. How these policy developments fit into China's domestic policy objectives and how they comply with China's WTO commitment are also discussed in this section. In section 3, we document our efforts on modeling recent changes in China's agricultural policy and on constructing various future scenarios. Section 4 reports results obtained from simulating the various policy scenarios. The last section concludes the paper.
Recent Development of Agricultural Domestic Support Policy in China
In this section we briefly review most recent agricultural policy development in China 
Elimination of agriculture taxes
Agriculture tax had been levied since the establishment of the People's Republic of China and an agricultural tax law was put into force formally in 1958. This tax was typically levied as a percentage of the production value of a given land area, based on historical prices and yields. The average tax rate (including agricultural tax 9 Orden et al. (2007) also discussed the PSE estimates for China, using data for the period 1995-2001. Gale et al. (2005) 
Introduction of direct subsidies
Accompanying the reduction and elimination of agriculture taxes and fees, the Chinese government has started to introduce various direct subsidies -including direct payments to grain producers based on acreages, direct subsidies to purchased farm inputs including fuels and fertilizers, direct subsidies to improved varieties of seeds, and direct subsidies to the purchase of agricultural machineries -to farmers and agricultural production (see Table 2 ).
In 2004, CNY11.6 billion from the State Grain Risk Fund was used to directly subsidize grain producers. The distribution of these subsidies roughly follows a twotier method. First, the central government transfers funds to the provinces based on each province's historical grain outputs as well as the amount of outputs supplied to the market. As such, much of this fund was paid to producers in the main grain producing provinces. Table 2 ).
Another major instrument of direct subsidies to farmers is linked to purchased farm inputs such as fuels and fertilizers. This subsidy, officially named "comprehensive direct subsidy to agriculture production materials" by the Chinese government, was first given in 2006 with a national expenditure of CNY12 billion. 10 It has been reported that it would rise to 27.6 billion in 2007 (Ministry of Finance, 2007) , mainly for the purposes of offsetting the high fuel costs to grain producers. The disbursement principle of this subsidy is again according to the area planted (taking into consideration that in some areas it is possible to harvest twice or more per year).
These two types of subsidies totaled CNY 26.2 billion in 2006 and were expected to reach CNY42.7 billion for 2007, which implies a per mu subsidy of CNY 27 nationwide (CNY30 for main grain production provinces and CNY 20 for other provinces).
11
In addition to the above subsidies, grain producers also receive additional payments based on the adoption of quality seeds and purchases of agricultural machineries.
Seed subsidies reached CNY4.15 billion in 2006 whereas subsidies to machineries were about CNY 600 million in the same year. has the reason to believe that the elimination of agricultural taxes will be permanent.
Total assistance to farmers and agricultural production
It is also probable that total public assistance to agriculture, including direct subsidies, will continue to rise. Assuming this trend continues, a relevant hypothetical scenario for illustration/discussion purposes is one in which China actually uses up all its WTO allowances in a future date.
In the Agreement on Agriculture of the WTO, the de minimis exemption available to a developing country member is generally set at 10 percent of the member's agricultural production value. In the case of China, this exemption is 8.5 percent as specified in its WTO accession agreement. In addition, China is also allowed to use Blue Box payments. There have been discussions on capping the Blue Box in the Doha Round negotiations and a 5 percent (of total agriculture production value) cap is assumed in this paper to facilitate our following discussion. In addition, as a WTO member, China is also allowed to apply the so-called Green Box payments which are nondistorting or "minimally" distorting. The limits on the de minimis payments and the Blue Box payments set the maximum amount of trade and production distorting domestic support that China are "allowed" to provide for its agriculture sector. A hypothetical scenario therefore assumes that China provide the two types of support up to their respective limits. Simulating this scenario provides the opportunity to quantitatively investigate how these allowances will be used and what kind of effects can be expected.
Modeling agricultural domestic support in China

The basic model and dataset
We adopt a computable general equilibrium model with agricultural sectoral details for modeling and analyzing recent changes in agricultural domestic support policy in China. This model is a modified version of the well-known global GTAP model (Hertel, 1997) . The simulation exercises of the model are based on the GTAP database. 13 The most recent GTAP version 7 data base (pre-release) at the time of conducting this study covers 101 countries/groups of countries and 57 sectors. 14 In order to characterize China's agricultural policy development in our numerical analysis, we make important modifications to both the GTAP model and the version 7 GTAP database. In addition, the land market and rural labor market specifications in the standard GTAP model have also been modified as the existing model structure is not enough to capture important features of the Chinese rural economy key to our analysis. Specifically, the essentially modifications include:
a. Modeling and calibrating China's agricultural domestic support policy into the GTAP model and the version 7 data base. This is described in the next section.
13 Documentation of the GTAP-7 database has not yet been made available. Detailed documentation of the GTAP-6 database, however, can be found in Dimaranan (2006) 14 Readers interested in the results for the rest of the world and for non-agricultural sectors can either request such results from the authors or find them in the zipped data package accompanying the paper.
b. Dividing total area of land in China into three separated types: arable land, land used for permanent crops, and pasture land. This separation is motivated by the fact that the Chinese government generally discourages farmers from switching land used in grain production to other uses. Moreover, China's territory covers several different climatic zones, each of which is suitable for growing a certain range of products. By dividing the total land area into three broadly defined land types, we avoid the obvious problem of allocating a certain type of land into producing certain products which it normally cannot produce economically (e.g.
turning permanent pasture land into rice paddies). Data for making this split has been obtained from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO).
Within each land type, in observing changing returns to land, land is allowed to move imperfectly among different products according to a constant elasticity of transformation function characterized by finite elasticities of transformation. Recently, Cai (2007) suggests that "residual" or unemployed/underemployed rural labor was about 105 million in the year 2005, or about 22% of total rural labor in
China for that year. By piecing together information from difference sources, Cai further estimates that the "residual" rural labor under the age of 40 was about 52 million in 2005, which was about 10.7% of China's total rural labor. Based on these estimates, we conjecture and calibrate a simple functional relationship between rural employment of unskilled labor and return to rural labor that specifies how increased return to rural labor stimulates additional rural employment. Denote L , l, w as respectively the total rural unskilled labor, the employed rural unskilled labor, and the wage rate for rural unskilled labor. 15 The elasticity of transformation used in our simulations is -1, the standard parameter value specified in the GTAP parameter file.
Assuming an upward-sloping labor supply curve defined as l = L -b/w where b is a coefficient, the elasticity of labor supply can be expressed as lw
Further defining the rural unemployment ratio as U = 1-l/L, E then becomes: E = U/(1-U). The labor supply elasticity can then be calibrated by only observing the unemployment ratio U. Noting that the labor supply elasticity can be written as the ratio of the percentage changes in l and w (denoted as lˆand ŵ , respectively), the following equation is immediate:
where U is taken from external sources and ŵ is solved by other branches of the model.
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The additional rural employment triggered by increased wage rate shifts out the production possibility frontier for agricultural products, which in turn limits the extent of wage hikes for rural labor. As will be seen later in this paper, the employment effect of agricultural subsidies is crucial in determining the welfare effects of recent agricultural policy changes in China.
Modeling and calibrating China's agricultural domestic support
Two steps are involved in modeling and calibrating China's agricultural domestic support policy into the GTAP mode. In the first step, we make a correspondence between the actual agricultural policy instruments of China -which are summarized and quantified in the OECD's Producer Support Estimates Table 3 . Where possible, we also place individual instruments into different WTO Boxes according to our understanding of the instruments in relation to the various "boxes" and how they are reported in China's notifications to the WTO. 17 These designations will facilitate our later discussion on the future development of China's agricultural domestic support. In the second step, the actual spending associated with each instrument/model variable needs to be calibrated into the GTAP database.
To make the discussion more concrete, we refer to the PSE estimates for China in 2003 (presented in the first data column in Table 3 ), a year before China implemented its ambitious agriculture tax reform and hence a good base year against which our numerical analysis on the effects of the reforms can be carried out. Furthermore, as these estimates have not been incorporated into the latest GTAP database at all (version 7 pre-release), we describe how the actual PSE estimates for 2003 are classified and how they are incorporated into the GTAP 7 database, which are subsequently used as the starting point for our evaluation of recent policy changes.
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Agricultural output tax or subsidy in the GTAP model captures the difference between the producer price and the market price of an agricultural product. A positive difference implies a subsidy whereas a negative difference signals a tax. This instrument is used to model China's agricultural tax on all primary agriculture products in the year 2003 (i.e. prior to the abolishment of agricultural tax). Due to the lack of data on the distribution of agricultural taxes across different products, a simplified assumption has been adopted in our calibration of the database to ensure that the nearly CNY49 billion agricultural tax and agricultural tax surcharges in 2003 are equal-proportionately distributed across all primary agricultural products. The special agricultural products tax of CNY 2.8 billion is distributed to the vegetable and fruits, and the other crops sectors.
the WTO negotiations. The WTO Boxes are more of a legal concept useful in negotiating reductions in domestic support policies and do not necessarily reflect the true levels of support to agriculture. For a discussion on the relationship between the PSE and WTO Boxes (or the Aggregated Measure of Support), see Josling et al. (1996) and Orden (2007) . 18 It is worth noting that the GTAP-7 database actually has 2004 as its base year. Therefore, it would be problematic if we directly calibrate China's agricultural domestic support policy in 2003 into the GTAP 7 database. However, the total agriculture production value in the GTAP 7 database is listed as CNY2,430,478 million, which is almost identical to the total agricultural production value reported by the OECD PSE Land (or capital)-based agricultural subsidy in the GTAP model measures the difference between farmers' rental price over the market rental price of land (or capital). A positive difference implies that farmers pay a tax, whereas a negative difference implies a subsidy in favor of farmers. Before the abolishment of agriculture tax, China used funds on the so-called "Grain for Green" program and made payments to alleviate the effects of natural disasters. These payments are considered as decoupled or "Green Box" subsidies given to arable land in our modeling. More specifically, the reported spending of CNY 66.9 billion for 2003 is assumed to be distributed to arable land used in individual crops according to the production value shares of these crops. In our hypothetical scenarios on future development of China's domestic support, additional land-based payments can either be decoupled payments or are assumed to be given to land used in grain production only. The final item listed in Table 3 is "on farm investment on infrastructure" which are modeled as a subsidy to capital used in all primary agriculture products.
It should be noted that the standard GTAP model treats the above policy instruments as ad valorem tax wedges. To make sure that the budget outlays under the various instruments reported in Table 3 are correctly represented in the modified GTAP database, in the actual calibration process we choose to target the budget outlays while allowing the tax wedges to adjust. abolishing agricultural taxes, introducing direct subsidies to grain producers, providing direct subsidies to grain producers for purchasing input and grain seeds.
Spending on these subsidies is assumed to increase from the 2003 level (presented in Column 1 in Table 3 ) to that of 2005 (reported in Column 2 in Table 3 ) and the shocks to the corresponding ad valorem instruments in the model are conducted in a way to lock in these targeted spending levels, as follows:
19 This is done by "swapping" the exogenous tax wedge with the normally endogenous budget outlays so that the latter becomes exogenous and can then be shocked into the level reported in Table 3 . Changing the budget outlays is carried out via a GTAP program called "altertax" (Malcolm, 1998 Reform scenario) is well below the permitted levels, simulating this scenario implies 21 According to the latest number from the PSE table, CNY 45 billion was used as subsidies to input uses, including payment made to state-owned agricultural input manufacturers to cover their losses resulting from selling pesticide, fertilizer and mulching film to farmers at the state administered price. It appears from latest official Chinese documents that direct subsidies for purchasing these inputs (also including fuel) have been offered farmers, having reached CNY 12 billion in 2006. It is not clear whether the subsidies paid to input producers have been reduced accordingly. In this paper, we assume that the subsidies offered to farmers were in addition to the subsidies given to the input producers. This results in a higher amount of total intermediate subsidies at around CNY 56.8 billion.
an increase of both types of payments from the baseline. The detailed assumptions applied in this scenario are as follows.
Among the instruments represented in the baseline (of 2005), direct subsidies given to grain producers are given according to historical planting areas and as such modeled as Blue Box payments. The assumed 5 percent Blue Box cap in the current scenario implies that these subsidies need to be increased from the 2005 baseline level of CNY 13.2 billion to 122 billion, which is roughly 5 percent of the agricultural production value around the year 2004. Note that by increasing direct subsidies to land used in grain production, additional arable land will move into grain production and away from non-grain production. This in turn will increase the output of grains. However, because of the inflow of additional arable land, the percentage increase in the per-mu subsidies will fall short of the percentage increase in total direct subsidies.
There are numerous scenarios in which the de minimis allowance can be used, because many instruments can be considered trade and production distorting. For illustration and discussion purposes, in this paper we assume that all the current nonblue box payments in the baseline are considered and remain part of the de minimis exemption. We then allocate the remaining de minimis allowance within the 8.5
percent limit -valued around CNY 149 billion -as output subsidies applied to all primary agricultural products.
22, 23
To summarize, this scenario introduces a new agriculture output subsidy of CNY 149 billion, maintains the same input-based subsidies of CNY 56.7 billion, and increases the direct subsidies to grain production (tied to land used in grain production) from CNY 13.2 billion to 122 billion. Taken together, this implies a total non-green box support of CNY 327.8 billion, representing an increase of non-Green Box support by roughly CNY 258 billion over the 2005 baseline level. 22 We adopt the following simplifying assumption in distribution this amount across products: each product receives an equal ad valorem output subsidy. Note that this instrument is exactly the opposite of the agricultural tax previously levied on agriculture outputs. 23 By only considering non-product specific de minimis payment, we avoid the more technical interpretations on how much support a country can actually spend within its de minimis limit. Moreover, this also simplifies the way the shocks in the scenario are generated. For a more rigorous discussion on the classification and measurement of domestic support instruments in WTO negotiation, see Brink (2007) .
The Decoupled Payment Scenario is a hypothetical scenario where China decides to spend the additional Blue Box and de minimis allowances -valued at around CNY 258 billion (which are over and above the current payments in the baseline of 2005;
see Table 3 ) in a "decoupled" manner. Similar to the recent reform of the Common Agriculture Policy of the European Union, we assume that these decoupled payments are given as a uniform payment to all arable land, regardless of the production choices made by land-owners among different crop products. These payments will augment farmers' income without distorting their production decisions. Therefore, these decoupled payments may be considered Green Box instruments which are not currently disciplined and capped by the WTO. Our modeling and implementation of these payments follow the method developed and documented in Frandsen et al. (2003) and Jensen and Yu (2006) .
Results
In this section simulation results are reported, mainly on changes of China's agriculture outputs, exports and imports (presented in Table 5 ), as well as the implied effects on economic welfare and farm income (reported in Table 4 
Effects of abolishing agricultural tax and providing direct subsidies (the
2004-05 Reform Scenario)
Abolishing agricultural tax on primary agriculture products -which are assumed to be uniform across these products -generally boost outputs of these products. However, the introduction of direct subsidies (modeled as a land-based subsidy) and the increased input-based subsidies to grain production further reduces the cost of producing grains and hence expands their outputs. From Table 5 , it can be seen that outputs of rice, wheat and other grains increase by 0.9, 6.3 and 2.1 percent, respectively. With the assumption of no productivity progresses in the agriculture sectors, these increases have been partially made possible by drawing land from the non-grain agricultural sectors. 24 For instance, areas of arable land used for producing other crops, sugar beet and cane, and plant fibers all decrease (see Table 6 ).
Furthermore, part of the previously unemployed or underemployed rural labor is attracted into agricultural production (a 1.2 percent increase in rural unskilled labor), especially in the production of grains.
Increased domestic production of grains and other agriculture products implies improved trade balances of these products due to increased exports (e.g. 19.9 percent for other grains and 48.4 percent for wheat) and reduced imports (8.3 percent for other grains and 17.2 percent for wheat), as can be seen from Table 5 .
The above results seem to suggest that the simulated policy changes do serve the purposes of increasing grain production and improving the self-sufficiency of grains, as compared to the pre-reform situation of 2003. Do these changes help improve farm income (which is the other important objective of these policy changes)? According to our simulation results, total factor income in primary agriculture rises by about 8 percent following these policy changes (Table 4 ). This overall increase in farm income can be understood by the large increases in total and per unit returns to production factors used in agriculture, in particular land and rural unskilled labor. Of the nearly 8 percent increase of total farm income, the increases in total returns to land and labor contribute respectively 4.6 and 2.9 percent (Table 4) . For different types of land, due to the disproportional distribution of subsidies across different products and the finite elasticity of transformation governing the allocation of different types of land across products, the average changes in rental prices of different types of land are different: rental price of arable land increases the most (over 16 percent on average), followed by that of pasture land and permanent crops (11.5 percent and 7.1 percent, respectively). As for the wage rate of rural unskilled labor, the increase of 3.8 percent is not as dramatic, reflecting the model assumption of unemployment/underemployment in the rural areas. In addition to the above, rural employment is also shown to increase at 1.2 percent, thereby augmenting the per unit increase in overall farm income.
The economic welfare consequence of these policy changes also appears to be positive. The calculated welfare gains (measured in equivalent variations) of US$2,255 million are due to the increased employment in agriculture, which shifts out the production possibility frontier of the economy, and a comparable gain in the terms-of-trade. In contrast, the joint allocation efficiency effects of abolishing agriculture tax and introducing direct subsidies are slightly negative, due to the large overall increases in government assistances.
Effects of exhausting allowable domestic support using existing instruments
(the "Allowable" Domestic Support Scenario)
In this scenario, with the output subsidies (within the 8.5 percent de minimis limit) equally distributed to all primary agriculture products, all outputs are boosted significantly (see Table 5 ). The extra acreage-based subsidies to grain farmers (the assumed Blue Box payments), however, alter the expansion patterns across products.
Outputs of rice, wheat and other grains increase by respectively 1.6, 12.1 and 5.9 percent over the 2005 baseline level. For a few other agricultural sectors -most notably oil seeds and other crops -outputs actually decline. Again, these output changes can be attributed to the inter-sectoral land reallocation and the increased rural employment. For instance, uses of arable land in wheat and other grains increase substantially (by 24 and 31 percent, respectively), thereby reducing arable land available to non-grain products such as other crops (-13 percent) and oil seeds (-6.6 percent).
Increased grain production leads to improved net trade positions for China in these products, with more dramatic increases in their exports and decreases in their imports This result can be partially explained by significantly higher land rental prices, especially for the land used in grain sector (increased by over 40 percent). Rental price of land in the non-grain sectors also increase due to the assumed increase in output subsidies, but to a less extent (12 percent for land used for growing permanent crops and 15.7 for pasture land). In addition, increases in both the wage rate for rural skilled labors (4.7 percent) and in rural employment (1.5 percent) also play important roles in augmenting overall farm income. Overall, increases in total returns to land and labor contribute respectively 12.4 and 3.5 percent of the 16.2 percent increase in total farm income (Table 4 ).
In terms of economic welfare, the additional subsidies assumed in this scenario lead to larger negative allocation efficiency effects to the Chinese economy, estimated to be US$1.65 billion. 26 However, increased rural employment (of unskilled labor) results in a gain of nearly US$1.6 billion. Coupled with a small positive terms of trade effect, the overall welfare effect (EV) turns out to be positive but very small at US$ 89 million.
It is worth noting that the welfare result is obtained without considering how the funds for the subsidies are raised. Through the computation of an additional scenario where an income tax hike is explicitly assumed for purposes of paying for these subsidies, we observe similar allocation efficiency and employment effects but a much larger, negative terms-of-trade effect, and a much larger total welfare loss.
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25 For a detailed discussion on comparative advantage and China's agricultural trade patterns, see Carter and Li (2002) . 26 In comparison to the increase in total government assistance to agriculture, this number appears to be quite small. In a general equilibrium model such as GTAP, subsidies are subtracted from national income whereas the derived increases in factor income are added. Welfare losses from the subsidies as a distortion are due to their efficiency effects, as the subsidies encourage inefficient domestic production. Unlike price-based instrument, these subsidies actually reduce prices which in term generate offsetting consumer gains. 27 The negative terms of trade effect due to the income tax can be explained in relation to the closure rule applied in the model which specifies the equality between the difference between savings and To summarize, by filling both the de minimis allowance and the assumed Blue Box cap, China would be able to significantly increase its grain outputs, improve its net trade positions in grains (but at the cost of reducing outputs of many non-grain agricultural products), and substantially raise farm income. But doing so would result in two conflicting welfare effects: a positive effect from extra agricultural employment and a negative allocation efficiency effect.
Effects of exhausting allowable domestic support using decoupled instrument
(the "Decoupled" Payment Scenario)
If the additional spending discussed in section 4.2 is used in a decoupled manner -as a uniform payment to arable land, regardless of where the land is used -simulation results show agricultural outputs in China will remain unchanged and there will be no changes to China's agricultural trade. This implies stable rural employment, a result that is different from what is expected from the "coupled" subsidies discussed in the previous scenario in section 4.2.
In this case, the decoupled payments are essentially income transfers to the owners of land, as they do not draw additional resources (e.g. rural labor, arable land, and capital) into the subsidized activities and do not cause inefficient reallocation of these resources across different agricultural activities. As such, they are considered nondistorting. Indeed, simulation results show higher increase in the returns to arable land (66 percent), as compared to the same result reported in the Allowable Domestic Support scenario. Consequently, total agriculture factor income rises by 17.1 percent, which is again higher than the 16.2 percent increase reported in the Allowable Domestic Support Scenario with the same amount of government spending, indicating that decoupled payments are more efficient in raising farm income.
However, because of these decoupled subsidies generate no production and trade distortions to the economy (other than transferring income from one branch of the population to another), relative prices remain virtually unchanged and no incentives investment and the national trade balance. With a substantial income tax hike, rate of return on capital falls below the corresponding international rate of return, resulting in less investment from the "global bank". Therefore, the trade balance must adjust upwards, leading to a deteriorated terms of trade. For more details, see Hertel (1997) .
have been created to attract more rural labor into agriculture production. As such, virtually no change in welfare is observed from the simulation results. that grain production increases, the trade balance of grain improves, and overall farm income as measured by total factor income in agriculture is estimated to rise by 8 percent. Much of the increase in grain production and farm income can be attributed to land reallocation to grain production, cheaper inputs, and extra agricultural employment triggered by the policy changes. Measured in terms of equivalent variation, the efficiency effect from reducing agricultural tax and introducing subsidies appears to be very small, whereas increased rural employment generates noticeable welfare gains (which offset the efficiency losses from introducing the direct subsidies).
Judging from the wide rural-urban and west-east income gaps currently existing in China, the declining shares of agriculture outputs in China's GDP and taxation in China government revenue, and most importantly the political consensus at the highest level on the importance of improving the livelihood of China's rural citizens, 28 The modeling assumption of one representative household also ensures that income transfer within that representative household generates no changes to aggregated demands.
we expect that the abolishment of agriculture tax will be permanent and that government assistance (including direct subsidies) to agriculture and farmers will continue and rise. Based on this belief, two hypothetical scenarios of China's domestic agriculture support in the future are developed with reference to the WTO limits set on these subsidies. In the first hypothetical scenario, we assume that China uses up all its WTO de minimis support allowances and the assumed Blue Box cap, in a manner that is consistent with current practices (including output subsidies and landbased grain subsidies). In the second hypothetical scenario, we explore alternative ways of providing the same amount of support (i.e. a uniform, land-based subsidy).
Simulations of these two scenarios provide further insights into possible consequences on grain production, trade, rural employment, farm income and economic welfare.
Results from the first hypothetical scenario show large increases of grain production over the baseline, a changing trade pattern seemingly contrary to China's comparative advantage, increased rural employment, significantly higher farm income (over 16%), and large negative allocation efficiency effect which is almost offset by the welfare gains derived from increased employment. In contrast, results from the second hypothetical scenario show that agricultural outputs and trade in China remain unchanged, rural employment stays stable. But as a way of transferring income, the decoupled payments seem to be more efficient and cause virtually no production distortions to the economy (hence no welfare implications).
In summary, the above results provide no clear-cut answers to what constitutes the preferred way of increasing agricultural domestic support in China. In designing future support policies, the tradeoff between achieving income transfer efficiency via decoupled subsidies and generating extra rural employment and higher grain outputs through coupled instruments must be taken into consideration. 
n/a n/a Seeds in grain production n/a 4,150 n/a n/a Dairy cows n/a 100
n/a n/a * The designations of the different instruments to the various WTO "Boxes" reflect the authors' understanding and treatment of these instruments in the model, with the references to China's official notification to the WTO (WTO, 2006) . Bold numbers in the first two columns are respectively the Chinese agricultural domestic support policies in 2003 and 2005 that are calibrated/shocked into the GTAP database. They are based on the OECD PSE estimates for China (OECD, 2006) . Very small deviations exist between these numbers and those reported in the PSE table, due to the calibration procedures adopted. Numbers in the last two columns are respectively the calibrated domestic support for the two hypothetical scenarios. ** The assumed Blue Box ceiling is 5 percent of China's agricultural production value, which was about CNY 122,045 million in 2004. *** The de minimis limit for China is 8.5 percent of the value of production or CNY 207,476 million in 2004. Thus, the maximum amount of non-green box domestic support in the two hypothetical scenarios is assumed to be CNY 329,521 million (de minimis + Blue Box). Potential complications arising from the possibility of using both product-specific and non-product specific de minimis payments have been ignored in generating this overall limit. 
